The impact of human capital on the early success of necessity versus opportunity-based entrepreneurs by Baptista, R et al.
Published in: Small Business Economics 42(4):831-847, 2014. 
The Impact of Human Capital on the Early Success of Necessity vs. 
Opportunity-based Entrepreneurs 
 
Rui Baptista 
Brunel Business School, Brunel University, UK 
and 
CEG-IST, Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon, Portugal 
 
Murat Karaöz 
Department of Econometrics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 
Akdeniz University, Antalya, Turkey  
 
Joana Mendonça 
IN+ Center for Innovation, Technology and Policy Research, Instituto Superior 
Técnico, University of Lisbon  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether founders’ backgrounds influence new firm survival in 
the early years after startup focusing in particular on the impact of unemployment-
driven entrepreneurship. For entrepreneurs who left their previous employment to found 
a new firm, both general and specific human capital play a key role in enhancing early 
survival chances. However, various forms of human capital have little effect on early 
survival of unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, who rely mostly on previous 
entrepreneurial experience to persevere. Results suggest that pre-entry capabilities play 
an important role in the early success of opportunity-based entrepreneurs, but have little 
influence on the early success of necessity-based ones.  
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1. Introduction 
Empirical studies of market selection indicate that entrants are heterogeneous and 
initial conditions influence subsequent success (see, for instance: Geroski et al., 2010). 
However, most of these studies develop and/or test theories focusing on the fit between 
firm characteristics and market conditions after those firms have entered markets, and 
often neglect the role played by the characteristics of founders.  
It can be argued that the creation of new firms involves ex-ante selection, as the 
would-be entrepreneurs evaluate whether an opportunity can be turned into a business 
which is sufficiently profitable to offset the opportunity costs involved (Barnett et al., 
2003; Stam et al., 2010). Two characteristics drive the entry decision: the munificence 
of opportunities and the availability of resources and capabilities. Research has 
attempted to develop a structure for theory-building and applied work about the role 
played by pre-entry resources and capabilities in driving both entry decisions and post-
entry performance (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Prior knowledge enables 
entrepreneurs to better recognize opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) and 
gives them the ability to exploit them. This knowledge might be unique to entrepreneurs 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
A central argument of this research is that the success of new organizations is 
fundamentally shaped by the pre-entry experiences of their founders. New organizations 
benefit from knowledge that was accumulated by their founders throughout their careers 
(Agarwal et al., 2004). The present paper examines the role played by the backgrounds 
of founders in influencing new firm survival in the critical early years after startup. In 
particular, we seek to examine the role played by human capital in influencing the early 
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success of individuals who gave up their previous employment position in order to start 
a business as opposed to those who founded a business following an unemployment 
spell. It seems logical to expect that the former are significantly more likely to be 
starting a business in order to exploit a discovered opportunity (opportunity-based 
entrepreneurs), while the latter are more likely to be starting a business out of necessity 
(that is, due to the lack of satisfactory employment prospects – necessity-based 
entrepreneurs). 
Research in labor economics has found that interrupted careers translate into 
depreciation of human capital stocks. We suggest that same might apply to 
entrepreneurs. Knowledge and skills acquired previously in the labor market are likely 
to depreciate during interruptions associated with unemployment spells, meaning that 
entrepreneurs who start firms out of unemployment are not only less likely to have 
recognized valuable opportunities, but also have less abilities (i.e. specific industry, 
finance or marketing knowledge, and organizational routines) to exploit them. 
Based on the extant literature, we propose hypotheses concerning the contribution of 
different sources of entrepreneurial human capital1 to new firm survival in the early 
years after startup, and use data on founders’ backgrounds to create measures of 
entrepreneurial human capital arising from these sources in order to test those 
hypotheses. In particular, we seek to establish whether different sources of 
entrepreneurial human capital play a different role in driving early survival for 
opportunity-based (i.e. previously employed) and necessity-based (i.e. previously 
unemployed) entrepreneurs.  
                                                
1 We distinguish between a variety of sources of founder human capital: formal education; work 
experience; industry-specific experience; managerial experience and business ownership experience. 
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By utilizing a longitudinal database linking firms, founders and employees, our study 
is able to examine a substantial number of startups and founders in a wide variety of 
sectors over several years. We contribute to the literature on new firm survival by taking 
into account the difference between opportunity and necessity (unemployment-driven) 
entrepreneurs, by using a wide variety of concepts of pre-entry human capital, and also 
by focusing on the early years in the life of firms.  
This research has important implications for both practitioners and policy-makers. 
Founders play a fundamental role in determining the mission, strategy and 
organizational structure of new firms,2 so studies of new firm success – particularly in 
the first few years after startup – are fundamentally incomplete when founders’ 
characteristics are overlooked. By looking at the chances of survival in the crucial early 
years after startup, this study provides insights for policy-makers on where to target 
government support to struggling young firms in order to maximize their contribution to 
overall competitiveness and employment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first part of section 2 reviews the 
literature establishing the influence of pre-entry capabilities and entrepreneurial human 
capital on the early success of new businesses and discusses a variety of ways in which 
entrepreneurs may accumulate specific human capital. In particular, we pay attention to 
differences between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, 
leading to the development of hypotheses with regard to their effect on new business 
survival. The second part of section 2 establishes the rationale for firm-level and 
industry controls. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy, while section 4 
                                                
2 Busenitz et al. (2003, p. 298) point out that “opportunities do not come to fruition without unique 
insights, perspectives, and interpretations by the founders, and are not transformed into wealth generation 
without organizing actions.” 
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displays and discusses the estimation results. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Entrepreneurial Human Capital and Factors Influencing Firm Survival 
2.1. Entrepreneurs’ Backgrounds, Human Capital, and Survival 
The early years after startup are crucial for a firm’s future. Virtually all studies in 
economics, management and organizational ecology find that younger firms confront 
higher probabilities of exit than their older counterparts (see, for instance, Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). The entrepreneurship literature often regards the first three years after 
startup as critical for the survival and success of new firms (Littunen et al., 1998). The 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys of entrepreneurial activity define 
young businesses as firms that have been active for three and a half years or less.3 
Geroski (1995, p. 424), points out that the “mechanism of displacement, which seems to 
be the most palpable consequence of entry, affects young, new firms more severely.” In 
economics, market selection theories argue that firms are unsure about their efficiency 
prior to entry and learn from noisy signals provided by the market, leading to higher exit 
rates for recent startups firms than for older businesses (see, for instance, Jovanovic, 
1982). Organizational ecologists speak of ‘liability of newness’ (Freeman et al., 1983) 
to describe the stylized fact that hazard rates decline monotonically with age as firms 
learn and adapt. Newly formed firms are less likely to be able to cope with 
environmental challenges than established organizations. 
                                                
3 According to the GEM definition, an enterprise is classified as a young business if it has paid salaries 
and wages for more than three months but for less than 42 months, and as an established business if it has 
paid salaries and wages for more than 42 months (Acs et al., 2005). 
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The findings of economists and organizational ecologists suggest that the faster a 
firm learns about the fit between its resources and capabilities and market conditions, 
and the more able it is to adapt its competences to market requirements, the more likely 
it will survive the critical early years after startup. The availability of pre-entry 
knowledge about innovative capabilities, marketing and finance, and organizational 
routines should influence significantly the probability of survival in these critical early 
years, when firms have had little or no time to learn about the market. For new firms 
that do not result from diversification or joint venturing operations, pre-entry 
capabilities are associated primarily with the founders. Entrepreneurs with greater 
stocks of human capital will be less uncertain about their efficiency and will be able to 
learn faster about market conditions, therefore reducing the probability of early exit. 
Brüderl et al. (1992) propose a framework distinguishing general and specific forms 
of entrepreneurial human capital, where general human capital includes education levels 
while specific human capital includes work experience and industry-specific experience. 
General and specific entrepreneurial human capital enhance the productivity of the 
founder-manager. We build on this distinction between general and specific forms of 
entrepreneurial human capital, associating them with specific phenomena that have been 
highlighted by entrepreneurship research (see, for instance, Dahl and Reichstein, 2007) 
as being related with the extent of opportunity identification and exploitation: spinouts, 
habitual entrepreneurship and, in particular, necessity-based vs. opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship. 
Let us start with general human capital. It can be claimed that, through formal 
education, individuals acquire fundamental abilities to learn about markets and 
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technology, and better recognize opportunities in the surrounding environment (Shane, 
2000). Formal education also allows individuals to develop learning aptitudes and 
organizational skills to better organize to exploit those opportunities (Grant, 1996). 
Consequently, higher levels of education may give the entrepreneur higher ability to 
solve problems and make decisions regarding business development. Better educated 
entrepreneurs may also have better social networks, as a result of their longer stay in the 
education system, and that may be useful for the development of their businesses 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Furthermore, better educated people should command higher 
average earnings as paid employees and, therefore, find it easier to fund their new 
business. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of studies of the returns to education for 
entrepreneurs, Van der Sluis et al. (2005) conclude that entrepreneurship performance, 
regardless of the performance measure used, is significantly and positively affected by 
formal education. We then expect that startups whose founder has a higher level of 
formal education have a greater probability of early survival.  
People with more work experience and who have performed managerial duties are 
more likely to be in a better position to detect opportunities and raise capital, thus 
setting up larger and better-equipped businesses (Colombo et al., 2004). Knowledge of 
how to manage a business has a strong tacit form and can be gained informally by 
observing and making business decisions (Cooper et al., 1994). People with greater 
managerial experience are also more likely to have developed the necessary skills to 
organize new businesses (Shane, 2000). We therefore expect that startups whose 
founder has more years of work experience and, in particular, more years of managerial 
experience have a greater probability of early survival.  
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Work experience is likely to be more useful for entrepreneurs when it takes place in 
the industry where the new firm is being started. In particular, entrepreneurs who forfeit 
employment in an established incumbent to create a startup in the same industry –  
thereby creating a spinout4 – are more likely to achieve early success. People who have 
worked in the same industry for some time are likely to have accrued industry-specific 
human capital, meaning specialized market and technological knowledge, plus a 
network of professional and social contacts that facilitate the acquisition and 
management of both technical and human resources. In addition, people that have 
worked in the industry may have already established relationships with customers, 
suppliers, or other stakeholders. Founders with greater industry experience are likely to 
bring to their new firm specific knowledge about a wide range of issues, such as 
customer demand, products, technologies, suppliers and competitors (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002). Previous research has shown that experience of the business owner 
in the same industry in which a new business is started improves a firm’s chances of 
survival and posterior firm performance (Bosma et al., 2004), even if such experience 
does not occur right before creating a startup. A period of time spent away from the 
industry may accelerate the depreciation of industry-specific human capital. Hence, 
while we expect that startups whose founder has more years of experience in the same 
industry should have a greater probability of early survival, startups whose founder was 
employed in the same industry right before startup (i.e. spinouts) will benefit more from 
industry-specific human capital. 
                                                
4 This definition of spinout is used by, among others, Agarwal et al (2004) and Klepper (2001, 2007) – 
who uses the term “spinoff.” While it may be deemed too inclusive (not all founders incorporated into 
this concept are necessarily exploiting opportunities discovered while working for their previous 
employer), any bias that may be introduced would counteract the effects supporting the hypotheses being 
tested. 
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Specific human capital which is valuable for new business founders also manifests 
itself through entrepreneurial experience. Habitual entrepreneurs, meaning individuals 
who have started at least one business prior to founding a new one,5 include individuals 
who own several businesses simultaneously (portfolio entrepreneurs), as well as those 
who start a business subsequent to closing – or selling – another (serial entrepreneurs). 
Individuals who have accrued experience as business owners should possess higher 
accumulated levels of entrepreneurial human capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Stam et al., 
2008). In particular, they should have better managerial and technical skills, better 
networks of contacts, access to market-specific information and knowledge, and thus 
should be better equipped to discover and take advantage from new business 
opportunities (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).  
The value of human capital is likely to be different for serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs. Serial entrepreneurs experience a break in between entrepreneurial 
events, which may last for an extended time (Amaral et al., 2011) and is likely to 
facilitate depreciation of the stock of specific human capital. Serial entrepreneurship is 
not necessarily associated with success, as it may result simply from a succession of 
business starts and closures. Portfolio entrepreneurs are less likely to face financial 
constraints to start a new firm than serial entrepreneurs, since they can deploy assets 
from their current firm (or firms) in the new startup. Recent research finds that serial 
entrepreneurs’ performance in one venture enhances their performance in subsequent 
ventures only temporarily (Parker, 2013). Hence, in addition to a positive effect on 
survival chances from entrepreneurial experience, we expect that startups whose 
                                                
5 The present study is restricted to business owners who have started their businesses, therefore excluding 
those who have acquired or inherited ownership. We believe that, in considering only starters and not 
acquirers and inheritors, we may better approach the concept of entrepreneurship as understood by the 
management literature (Busenitz et al., 2003). 
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founder owns one or more other businesses at the time of founding (portfolio 
entrepreneurs) have a greater probability of early survival.  
The key element in our analysis is the distinction between the role played by human 
capital for opportunity-driven and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs. People who 
give up their current employment to start a new business incur an opportunity cost, so 
they are likely to be doing it due to the discovery of a promising business opportunity. 
People who are driven from unemployment into starting a business are likely to be 
doing it in order to make ends meet. Unemployment is a powerful driver of new firm 
creation. Founding a new firm may be an alternative to uncertain future career prospects 
or even an “escape from unemployment” (Storey, 1991). The empirical evidence 
highlighting the role played by job losses in fostering new startups is quite robust 
(Storey and Jones, 1987). If unemployment is the main incentive for setting up a 
business, there may not be time to look for good opportunities, make detailed plans, get 
appropriate funding, and seek advice. Hence, the chances of survival may be affected by 
selection occurring prior to startup.  
Specific human capital and entrepreneurial abilities may erode with unemployment 
spells. Research in labor economics has found that interrupted careers translate into 
depreciation of human capital stocks. Mincer and Ofek (1982) established that 
interrupted work careers entail substantial wage reductions upon re-entry to the labor 
market, implying depreciation in human capital stocks. A substantial body of 
subsequent research has confirmed that human capital depreciates with time spent away 
from the workplace (see, for instance, Neuman and Weiss, 1995; Albrecht et al., 1999). 
Entrepreneurs’ knowledge and skills acquired previously in the labor market (either as a 
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business owner or a paid employee), while remaining of some value, gradually become 
less applicable as circumstances change, and interruptions associated with 
unemployment spells are likely to accelerate the depreciation of human capital stocks, 
meaning that entrepreneurs who start firms out of unemployment have less abilities (i.e. 
specific industry, finance or marketing knowledge, and organizational routines) to 
exploit them. 
Empirical evidence on entrepreneurial careers has found that those who have entered 
self employment directly from unemployment exit to a higher extent than those who 
have entered directly from paid employment (Carrasco, 1999; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000), 
and that new founders who were formerly unemployed have on average lower economic 
outcomes and a lower propensity to positively contribute to job creation (Andersson and 
Wadensjö, 2006). In view of this discussion, we formulate two key hypotheses: 
H1: startups whose founder was unemployed right before founding have a lower 
probability of early survival.  
H2: different forms of specific human capital of founders may have less positive 
impacts on firm survival probabilities for unemployment-driven entrepreneurs than for 
other entrepreneurs. 
2.2. Control Variables 
Mortality rates vary consistently across firms and industries, regardless of age. An 
extensive literature examining firm-level and industry-level determinants of new firm 
survival and growth has built up over the last decades. Comprehensive reviews of such 
determinants are provided by Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007), and Quatraro and Vivarelli 
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(2013). We use the main results from this literature as guidance for the choice of 
controls used in this study.  
The main firm-level determinant of survival is startup size. While the theoretical 
literature does not point towards a clear prediction of the effect of firm size on survival, 
empirical evidence supporting a “liability of smallness”, meaning a negative 
relationship between hazard rates and size, is overwhelmingly unambiguous (Vivarelli, 
2007). Therefore, we expect that firms that enter at a lower scale will have a lower 
probability of survival and use firm size at the time of founding as a control variable. 
The resource-based view of the firm posits that the ability of firms to survive and to 
compete successfully is strongly influenced by the extent to which firms develop firm-
specific assets, processes and routines which cannot be easily imitated by competitors 
(Peteraf, 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). A number of authors have pointed out that 
a firm’s knowledge resides in its human resources (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Teece et 
al., 1997). Mata and Portugal (2002) argue that the level of the formal education held by 
a firm’s workforce can be regarded as a measure, albeit imperfect, of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities. We therefore use the level of education of employees at the 
time of founding as a control.  
The literature reports four main industry-level features influencing survival: i) 
economies of scale; ii) market concentration; ii) barriers to entry; and iv) industry 
growth (see, for instance, Mata and Portugal, 2002; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
However, the effects of some of these factors are not always consistent in the theoretical 
and empirical literature (Vivarelli, 2007). Since the industry where the startup occurs 
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clearly influences survival in a variety of ways, this study accounts for this influence by 
using industry fixed effects (i.e. industry dummies) in the empirical analysis. 
Finally, we also control for the gender of the entrepreneur. Empirical findings on the 
success of ventures started by female entrepreneurs have been mixed. For instance, 
Cooper et al. (1994) find that firms with a male entrepreneur have a greater probability 
of high growth, but not of survival. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We explore the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) database, a longitudinal matched 
employer-employee data set built from mandatory information submitted annually by all 
firms with at least one wage earner (excluding agriculture) to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security covering the period from 1986 to 2005. There are a 
minimum of 145,000 firms, 170,000 establishments and 2,000,000 workers and 
business owners included in each annual survey. Firms, establishments and individuals 
are fully cross-referenced through the use of a unique identification number, thus 
allowing for the recognition of both new entrants and exiting firms, as well as the 
opening and closure of subsidiary establishments. Mobility of workers and business 
owners across firms and establishments over time can also be traced. For each firm, data 
are available for size (employment), age, location, sector, and number of establishments. 
 14 
Data on business owners and employees include gender, age, function (hierarchical 
level),6 tenure, and formal education.  
We focus our analysis on the founders of startups using four sets (or cohorts) of two 
years each: 1995-96; 1997-98; 1999-2000, and 2001-2002. Estimating econometric 
models for the four cohorts separately allows us to check the structure of the data and 
robustness of results. We restrict the size of cohorts to two years since human capital 
stocks are likely to depreciate, so it is better to compare founders of ventures started 
within a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, separating cohorts of entrants into 
two-year periods also avoids business cycle effects which affect firms entering in 
multiple years differently. Models pooling all data together are also estimated.7 We are 
able to track the background of every founder to the first available year of data, which is 
1986. This means that, for the first year (1995) we trace the work history of founders for 
the period 1986-94, while for the last year (2002) we trace the work history of founders 
for the period 1986-2001. This way we are able to build substantial information on their 
past professional, entrepreneurial and industry-specific experience.  
The sample includes startups in both services and manufacturing, defined at the three 
digit level of aggregation.8 We deliberately use the founder, and not the firm, as the unit 
of analysis, choosing not to aggregate measures of entrepreneurial human capital, and 
instead control for those founders who have partners.9 We follow this procedure since 
aggregating human capital across new business founders is not a simple task. On one 
                                                
6 The data have information about each individual’s occupational position and status within the firm 
coded using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the International 
Classification by Status in Employment (ICSE). 
7 Year-level dummy variables are included in these estimations.  
8 While the data allow for lower levels of industry aggregation, a change in ISIC definitions in 1994 
prevents us from making correspondences between sectors before and after that alteration. Such 
correspondences are indispensable to track founders’ pre-entry experiences. 
9 About 51% of startups are founded by entrepreneurial teams.  
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hand, it is not clear whether simply adding indicators of entrepreneurial human capital 
across the entrepreneurial team would produce an accurate measure of entrepreneurial 
human capital for the firm; on the other hand, considering only one of the founders as 
representative of the firm (even if it is the one with the highest levels of entrepreneurial 
human capital) while ignoring the other partners is also likely to be inaccurate. 
We expect that firms started by teams of founders will have a greater chance of 
survival, since a team likely benefits from more entrepreneurial human capital than a 
single founder. Young businesses are usually formed of like-minded individuals with 
the same initial view about the best course of action for the firm (Klepper, 2007), so the 
cohesion of the team will be high, at least in the first years after founding. Often teams 
coalesce to launch a venture because their members have worked together as employees 
in a larger organization or in a previous entrepreneurial venture; at other times, the 
founders themselves select team members, often with diverse talents and skills (Barney 
et al., 1996), so the process of venture team formation may endow teams with 
complementary knowledge and capabilities.  
QP data include all wage workers and business owners who are at least 18 years old. 
While we include all founders in our sample regardless of their year of birth, we control 
for founder age by including dummy variables for age classes: less than 30 years old; 
30-39 years old; and 40-49 years old. The age class that serves as reference for the age 
dummies corresponds to founders that are 50 years or older).10 While older people have 
had more time to build better networks, identify valuable opportunities, and are more 
likely to have accumulated capital to finance the startup (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
                                                
10 Entrepreneur age is measured in the year of founding. Using dummy variables for age classes 
considerably reduces the inevitable high correlation between age and work experience.  
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1998), evidence shows that the positive effect of age on the probability of success fades 
as age increases, since older people may be less prone to embark upon the more 
demanding work schedules required by self-employment, and are closer to retirement 
(Evans and Leighton, 1989). We group all founders who are 50 years or older into a 
single age class since several empirical studies suggest that the negative effect of age on 
survival starts to dominate the positive effect around this age (Rees and Shah, 1986; 
Carrasco, 1999). 
Table 1 displays the main descriptive statistics for each cohort of founders as well as 
the total sample. The number of startups recorded increased consistently during the 
period of analysis. This could be partly due to increased coverage of the database. 
However, since all the firms report their age and the tenure of their employees, it is 
possible to identify true startups vs. firms that simply show up in the database for the 
first time. Hence, our sample reflects a true increase in startup activity.  
Table 1 about here  
The average age of founders, the number of founders per firm, the proportion of 
unemployed founders and the proportion of survivors show little variation across the 
four cohorts. The proportion of previously unemployed11 founders is particularly 
striking, at over 75% for the whole sample, never falling below 72% for any of the 
cohorts.  
                                                
11 The average length of an unemployment spell in our data is 1.3 years. While the vast majority of 
individuals who appear ‘unemployed’ in the Quadros de Pessoal database in fact correspond to the share 
of the workforce who is without occupation and actively searching for employment, a small minority may 
be composed of inactive individuals (e.g. people who were once employed but went back to being full 
time students), or individuals who are employed in industries not covered by the database (e.g. 
agriculture). 
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Tables 1A and 1B present separate descriptive statistics for previously unemployed 
(necessity-based) and previously employed (opportunity-based) founders. The 
proportion of opportunity-based founders increases from about 22% in 1995-96 to about 
27% in 2001-2002. Key statistics appear not to be much different for the two types of 
founders: they are, on average, about the same age, start similarly sized companies 
(slightly larger for opportunity-based entrepreneurs)12 and form similarly sized venture 
teams. The survival rate of opportunity-driven founders is a little above average in all 
cohorts and for the whole sample, while the survival rate for unemployment-driven 
founders is consistently slightly below average.  
Tables 1A and 1B about here 
Detailed variable definitions plus descriptive statistics for the whole sample (1995-
2002) are presented in Table 2. Spinouts represent about 7% of the sample, while 
portfolio entrepreneurs are about 6%.  
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Correlations between explanatory variables 
are generally small, with the exception of work experience and industry-specific 
experience, which are highly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.62); 
however, this correlation does not seem to affect the estimations significantly.  
Table 3 about here 
                                                
12 During the period under analysis, there was no government support specifically directed at start-ups by 
the unemployed in Portugal. Support was available equally regardless of employment status. 
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Assuming that necessity-based entrepreneurship corresponds directly to 
unemployment-driven entrepreneurship raises some problems, since data are collected 
on a yearly basis. Firstly, a founder of a new business in year t who was registered as 
unemployed in year t-1 might have found a job in between the data collection time in 
year t-1 and the new business start. Someone in these circumstances is recorded by the 
data as if he/she were starting the firm following unemployment, when in fact he/she is 
starting the firm following employment. Likewise, a founder of a new business in year t 
who was registered as employed at time t-1 might have undergone a short spell of 
unemployment in between the data collection time in year t-1 and the new business 
start, and is therefore erroneously recorded by the data as if he/she were starting the firm 
following employment. In spite of such limitations, we believe the approach followed 
here to be advantageous for the study of the research questions investigated in the 
present paper. 
3.2. Methodology 
We observe firms in the year of entry and again three years later. Our dependent 
variable (survival) is a dummy that assumes value one if the firm is still operating and 
the founder is still the owner (or one of the owners) three years after startup, and value 
zero otherwise. Exit may result from closure or acquisition. However, acquisition is a 
rare phenomenon in the Portuguese context (Mata et al., 1995) and the overwhelming 
majority of exits is likely to result from closure.  
All variables used refer to the moment of entry, as we are interested in the effect of 
founding conditions (such as the pre-entry experiences of entrepreneurs) on early 
survival. The effect of the explanatory variables can then be captured using the Logit 
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regression model of the probability of survival. In order to examine the differences in  
outcomes between opportunity-driven and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, we 
estimate separate models for those founders who were previously employed and for 
those who were previously unemployed. In this way we are able to verify whether the 
effects of the entrepreneur human capital variables differ according to the type of 
entrepreneur.13  
 
4. Results 
Logit models for the probability of survival three years after startup are estimated for 
each cohort separately and for the whole sample. In all estimations the standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The results are, in general, quite comparable, confirming 
that the models are robust and each of the cohorts displays similar features. Table 4 
presents the estimations for a ‘reduced’ model including both opportunity-based and 
unemployment-driven founders using only firm-level variables and industry dummies 
(the controls), and a dummy variable identifying previously employed founders. 
Coefficients for the estimations using the whole sample are, in general, more significant 
than coefficients for estimations using each individual cohort, which should be expected 
given the larger number of observations. The signs of the coefficients for each variable 
are persistently the same across cohorts and for the whole sample. 
Table 4 about here 
                                                
13 An alternative procedure would be to estimate single models including interaction (moderator) 
variables corresponding to the product between the employment (opportunity-based) dummy and each of 
the entrepreneur human capital variables. However, the estimation of separate models for each type of 
entrepreneur avoids using interaction effects whose interpretation, especially in a Logit framework, is 
always problematic.  
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Of particular interest are the coefficients for the Employment variable in Table 4. 
The expectation is that previously employed (i.e. opportunity-based) founders should be 
significantly more likely to survive than unemployment-driven ones, but the positive 
coefficients are only weakly significant for the whole sample and two of the cohorts. 
Hence, hypothesis H1 is supported only weakly by the data, if at all. This result suggests 
that differences between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven founders do not 
necessarily arise directly from the nature or quality of the opportunity being exploited, 
and are more likely to result from the use of their abilities (i.e. accumulated human 
capital). 
In Tables 5A and 5B we estimate separate models for previously unemployed and 
previously employed founders, adding the entrepreneurial human capital variables to the 
mix of explanatory variables in order to test hypothesis H2.14 The inclusion of the set of 
variables accounting for entrepreneurial characteristics in Tables 5A and 5B 
significantly improves the models.15 A model testing the effects of different sources or 
forms of entrepreneur human capital for the sample as a whole was also estimated,16 
showing mixed results for the effects of human capital variables. Portfolio entrepreneurs 
and spinout founders are significantly more likely to survive, confirming our 
expectations for these two types of entrepreneurial human capital, while other 
entrepreneurial human capital variables are insignificant. These results suggest that 
advantages of entrepreneurs who were not unemployed before startup concentrate on 
                                                
14 A model pooling all entrepreneurs and adding interaction effects between the Employment variable and 
the human capital variables was estimated, showing significantly positive interaction effects favoring 
previously employed founders, thus supporting the results of the separate estimations presented here. 
Results are available from the authors upon request. 
15 Tests comparing the Wald statistics for models with and without the variables accounting for 
entrepreneurial characteristics show that the inclusion of this set of variables significantly improves 
explanatory power at the 1% significance level for all cohorts individually and the sample as a whole. 
16 Results are omitted due to lack of space and are available from the authors upon request. 
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spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs, while there seem to be no significant 
differences in early survival probabilities between unemployment-driven entrepreneurs 
and previously employed entrepreneurs who are not part of those two specific groups. 
Tables 5A, 5B about here 
The effects of both firm-level variables and industry dummies are analogous for both 
types of founders, suggesting that any differences in performance are likely to originate 
from entrepreneurial characteristics (human capital). The control variables have, in 
general, the expected effects, confirming previous findings in the empirical literature. 
The variable accounting for employee education becomes insignificant when 
entrepreneur human capital variables are added, which is not surprising since startups 
are usually small (the average startup size across all cohorts is 4.34 wage earners) and 
their faith is more likely to hinge on the founders’ choices.17 Entrepreneurial teams are 
significantly more likely to survive the critical first years after startup, suggesting that 
there are tangible and intangible features of entrepreneurial human capital that can be 
added or matched across the members of the entrepreneurial team, positively 
influencing startup survival. 
The estimations in Table 5B do not include the variables accounting for spinouts and 
portfolio entrepreneurs, since in these cases the founders were not unemployed before 
startup. Comparing effects of the other sources of entrepreneurial human capital 
between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs provides quite 
striking results. While the variables accounting for age, gender, and the existence of an 
entrepreneurial team yield consistent results, the coefficient estimations for 
                                                
17 Also, recent research finds evidence of a match between founders’ and early employees’ characteristics 
and human capital (Baptista et al., 2013). 
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entrepreneurial human capital variables yield very different results for necessity-
based/unemployment-driven (Table 5A) and opportunity-based (Table 5B) founders. 
While variables accounting for education levels and specific forms of human capital 
are generally insignificant (and even display counter-intuitive signs, as is the case of 
industry experience and managerial experience) for necessity-based/unemployment-
driven entrepreneurs, the same variables are significant and display the expected signs 
for opportunity-based entrepreneurs. We can therefore claim that our hypothesis H2 is 
in general supported by the data. 
Higher levels of education have a significantly positive impact on the probability of 
early survival for both types of founders.18 However, work experience, industry 
experience, and managerial experience only contribute significantly to increase the 
probability of early survival of opportunity-based entrepreneurs (across all cohorts and 
for the whole sample) and not for necessity-based ones.  
Entrepreneurial experience seems to be an important factor in the survival of 
necessity-based entrepreneurs, but not of opportunity-based ones. This suggests that, in 
the case of opportunity-based founders, other kinds of pre-entry human capital such as 
general education and work, industry, and managerial experience can successfully 
compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial experience in the case of opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs, possibly because higher levels of general and specific human capital help 
founders learn faster about the market, technology, and internal organization, and 
                                                
18 The completion of a high school degree seems to have a bigger impact when compared with primary 
education than a university degree, but both are significantly positive across all cohorts and for the 
complete sample. 
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provide them with the required networks of contacts regarding sources of finance, 
prospective customers, and suppliers. 
Overall, the results suggest that, while a variety of forms of specific human capital 
(particularly industry-specific and managerial experience) counterbalance the lack of 
entrepreneurial experience in opportunity-driven founders, unemployment-driven 
founders may benefit from accumulated learning that occurred in previous 
entrepreneurial experiences which might provide them with knowledge about how to 
sustain  a business in the early years, or possibly make them more persistent in the face 
of poor outcomes.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study sought to examine the role played by pre-entry capabilities and human 
capital associated with the experiences of founders in contributing for the early survival 
of new businesses, highlighting differences between opportunity based and necessity-
based/unemployment-driven entrepreneurs. It can be argued that entrepreneurial 
characteristics play an especially important role in the critical early years of a startup, 
when the mission and organization of the firm are being established, and the hiring of 
key personnel is being carried out.  
In summary, the results imply that for entrepreneurs who were employed prior to 
startup – that is, those more likely to be driven by opportunity discovery – both general 
and specific forms of entrepreneurial human capital contribute to increase the 
probability of surviving the critical first three years after startup. However, for 
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entrepreneurs who were unemployed prior to startup – and therefore more likely to be 
starting a firm as an escape from unemployment – only previous entrepreneurial 
experience seems to increase significantly the probability of early survival. The results 
also highlight two cases where the chances of early survival are especially strong and 
significant: spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs have consistently greater 
chances of early survival than other founders.   
The creation of new firms involves both opportunity discovery and evaluation, as 
would-be entrepreneurs decide whether an opportunity can be turned into a business 
which is sufficiently profitable to offset the opportunity costs involved. Opportunity 
evaluation and exploitation involves knowledge about demand, technology, 
organization, customers and suppliers that may be learned by founders prior to entry. 
The advantages uncovered  for spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs, as well as 
the findings that industry-specific and managerial experience matter only for founders 
who were not unemployed prior to startup, suggest that these are indeed more likely to 
have engaged in opportunity evaluation and are better equipped for opportunity 
exploitation, while unemployment-driven entrepreneurs are less likely to search and 
evaluate opportunities, relying on previous entrepreneurial experience to persevere in 
the early years after startup.  
The specific phenomena of spinouts and portfolio entrepreneurship deserve particular 
attention in the study of pre-entry capabilities and entrepreneurial human capital. 
Firstly, spinouts probably incorporate an organizational heritage from the parent-
company, by which founders possibly replicate knowledge, technologies and 
organizational features learned in the firms they left, which represent the environments 
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where they probably discovered their entrepreneurial opportunity (Klepper, 2001; 
2007); secondly, portfolio entrepreneurship is likely to provide more network 
connections and knowledge of potential customers, and a greater ability to overcome 
financial constraints. In particular, it is likely that for both types of founders the 
opportunity for the new business was discovered and evaluated in the environment of 
the previous business.  
We believe these results hold meaningful implications for both theory building and 
policy-making. Pre-entry knowledge of entrepreneurs is a significant determinant of 
early survival, but mostly in the cases where founders actually bore an opportunity cost 
(leaving their previous employment) to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity. In these 
cases, pre-entry knowledge associated with general and specific human capital helps 
discover and evaluate opportunities, set up the business, and endure the critical first 
years after founding, possibly by facilitating more cumulative learning about the 
market. It can be argued that these entrepreneurs are the ones more likely to grow their 
businesses, create jobs, and contribute to general economic growth. These results are 
important for those in charge of private and public institutions dedicated to assist the 
development of entrepreneurial startups. While aiding startups by the unemployed may 
be a socially important endeavor, policy makes should not expected these startups to 
survive in the long term and contribute significantly to employment growth. In contrast, 
aiding those founders who face an opportunity cost to found their businesses is more 
likely to provide positive results. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. 
Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Unemployed 
Founders 
Percentage of 
Founders 
Surviving after 
three years 
1995-1996 28772 4.70 36.28 1.38 77.38 74.69 
1997-1998 32180 4.57 36.15 1.37 78.51 75.99 
1999-2000 44749 3.95 35.88 1.37 77.68 72.50 
2001-2002 64217 4.32 38.72 1.39 72.02 79.07 
Total 169918 4.34 37.07 1.38 75.65 76.01 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of previously unemployed 
founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Founders Surviving 
after three years  
1995-1996 22263 4.37 36.13 1.36 74.38 
1997-1998 25266 4.23 35.97 1.36 75.49 
1999-2000 34759 3.61 35.93 1.36 71.86 
2001-2002 46248 4.10 39.07 1.37 78.09 
Total 128536 4.04 37.10 1.36 75.25 
 
 
 
Table 1B: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of previously employed 
founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Founders Surviving 
after three years  
1995-1996 6509 6.01 36.80 1.43 75.74 
1997-1998 6914 6.04 36.79 1.41 77.80 
1999-2000 9990 5.29 35.67 1.40 74.72 
2001-2002 17969 4.98 37.83 1.45 81.57 
Total 41382 5.39 36.97 1.43 78.37 
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Table 2: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition No. Obs* Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Survival Variable = 1 if both firm and founder remain active three years after founding, and 0 otherwise 169918 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Log Size Log of the number of employees of the firm at founding 169918 1.23 0.73 0 6.46 
Emp Education Proportion of employees that are university graduates at founding  165354 0.016 0.11 0 1 
Age below 30 Variable = 1 if founder is 29 years of age or younger at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Age 30-39 Variable = 1 if founder is between 30 and 39 years of age at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Age 40-49 Variable = 1 if founder is between 40 and 49 years of age at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Gender Variable = 1 if founder is female, and 0 if it is male 169918 0.28 0.45 0 1 
University Grad Variable = 1 if founder is a university graduate at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.08 0.28 0 1 
High School 
Grad 
Variable = 1 if founder is a high school graduate at 
the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Work Exp Number of years since founder entered the labor market 169918 1.58 2.20 0 8 
Spinout 
Variable = 1 if founder was working in an 
incumbent of the startup’s industry in the year 
before founding, and 0 otherwise 
169918 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Industry Exp Number of years founder worked in the startup’s industry prior to founding 169918 1.31 1.98 0 8 
Managerial Exp Number of years the founder worked in one of the top three hierarchical levels listed in the data set19 169918 0.52 1.28 0 8 
Entrep Exp 
Variable = 1 if individual has founded at least one 
firm in the past, but was not a business owner at 
founding, and 0 otherwise 
169918 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Portfolio Variable = 1 if individual owned at least another business at founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.06 0.38 0 1 
Entrep Team Variable = 1 if firm is being founded by more than one individual, and 0 otherwise 169918 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Employment Variable = 1 if founder was employed in the year before founding 169918 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Year Dummies Year dummies for cohort estimations: Variables = 1 for firms founded in 1995 and 0 otherwise; 1997 and 0 otherwise; 1999 and 0 otherwise; 2001 and 0 otherwise 
Industry 
Dummies Industry dummies at the three-digit level 
* The number of observations is not the same for all variables since there are missing values across the data set. We have 
therefore an unbalanced panel. 
                                                
19 As pointed out earlier, data report each individual’s position in the firm’s hierarchy according to a 
specific code. There are eight categories or hierarchical levels. These are, from lower to higher: 
apprentices, interns and trainees; non-skilled professionals; semi-skilled professionals; skilled 
professionals; higher-skilled professionals; supervisors and team leaders; intermediary managers: and top 
managers. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines whether founders’ backgrounds influence new firm survival in 
the early years after startup focusing in particular on the impact of unemployment-
driven entrepreneurship. For entrepreneurs who left their previous employment to found 
a new firm, both general and specific human capital play a key role in enhancing early 
survival chances. However, various forms of human capital have little effect on early 
survival of unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, who rely mostly on previous 
entrepreneurial experience to persevere. Results suggest that pre-entry capabilities play 
an important role in the early success of opportunity-based entrepreneurs, but have little 
influence on the early success of necessity-based ones.  
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Opportunity-based Entrepreneurship; Necessity-based Entrepreneurship.  
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1. Introduction 
Empirical studies of market selection indicate that entrants are heterogeneous and 
initial conditions influence subsequent success (see, for instance: Geroski et al., 2010). 
However, most of these studies develop and/or test theories focusing on the fit between 
firm characteristics and market conditions after those firms have entered markets, and 
often neglect the role played by the characteristics of founders.  
It can be argued that the creation of new firms involves ex-ante selection, as the 
would-be entrepreneurs evaluate whether an opportunity can be turned into a business 
which is sufficiently profitable to offset the opportunity costs involved (Barnett et al., 
2003; Stam et al., 2010). Two characteristics drive the entry decision: the munificence 
of opportunities and the availability of resources and capabilities. Research has 
attempted to develop a structure for theory-building and applied work about the role 
played by pre-entry resources and capabilities in driving both entry decisions and post-
entry performance (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Prior knowledge enables 
entrepreneurs to better recognize opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) and 
gives them the ability to exploit them. This knowledge might be unique to entrepreneurs 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
A central argument of this research is that the success of new organizations is 
fundamentally shaped by the pre-entry experiences of their founders. New organizations 
benefit from knowledge that was accumulated by their founders throughout their careers 
(Agarwal et al., 2004). The present paper examines the role played by the backgrounds 
of founders in influencing new firm survival in the critical early years after startup. In 
particular, we seek to examine the role played by human capital in influencing the early 
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success of individuals who gave up their previous employment position in order to start 
a business as opposed to those who founded a business following an unemployment 
spell. It seems logical to expect that the former are significantly more likely to be 
starting a business in order to exploit a discovered opportunity (opportunity-based 
entrepreneurs), while the latter are more likely to be starting a business out of necessity 
(that is, due to the lack of satisfactory employment prospects – necessity-based 
entrepreneurs). 
Research in labor economics has found that interrupted careers translate into 
depreciation of human capital stocks. We suggest that same might apply to 
entrepreneurs. Knowledge and skills acquired previously in the labor market are likely 
to depreciate during interruptions associated with unemployment spells, meaning that 
entrepreneurs who start firms out of unemployment are not only less likely to have 
recognized valuable opportunities, but also have less abilities (i.e. specific industry, 
finance or marketing knowledge, and organizational routines) to exploit them. 
Based on the extant literature, we propose hypotheses concerning the contribution of 
different sources of entrepreneurial human capital1 to new firm survival in the early 
years after startup, and use data on founders’ backgrounds to create measures of 
entrepreneurial human capital arising from these sources in order to test those 
hypotheses. In particular, we seek to establish whether different sources of 
entrepreneurial human capital play a different role in driving early survival for 
opportunity-based (i.e. previously employed) and necessity-based (i.e. previously 
unemployed) entrepreneurs.  
                                                
1 We distinguish between a variety of sources of founder human capital: formal education; work 
experience; industry-specific experience; managerial experience and business ownership experience. 
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By utilizing a longitudinal database linking firms, founders and employees, our study 
is able to examine a substantial number of startups and founders in a wide variety of 
sectors over several years. We contribute to the literature on new firm survival by taking 
into account the difference between opportunity and necessity (unemployment-driven) 
entrepreneurs, by using a wide variety of concepts of pre-entry human capital, and also 
by focusing on the early years in the life of firms.  
This research has important implications for both practitioners and policy-makers. 
Founders play a fundamental role in determining the mission, strategy and 
organizational structure of new firms,2 so studies of new firm success – particularly in 
the first few years after startup – are fundamentally incomplete when founders’ 
characteristics are overlooked. By looking at the chances of survival in the crucial early 
years after startup, this study provides insights for policy-makers on where to target 
government support to struggling young firms in order to maximize their contribution to 
overall competitiveness and employment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first part of section 2 reviews the 
literature establishing the influence of pre-entry capabilities and entrepreneurial human 
capital on the early success of new businesses and discusses a variety of ways in which 
entrepreneurs may accumulate specific human capital. In particular, we pay attention to 
differences between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, 
leading to the development of hypotheses with regard to their effect on new business 
survival. The second part of section 2 establishes the rationale for firm-level and 
industry controls. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy, while section 4 
                                                
2 Busenitz et al. (2003, p. 298) point out that “opportunities do not come to fruition without unique 
insights, perspectives, and interpretations by the founders, and are not transformed into wealth generation 
without organizing actions.” 
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displays and discusses the estimation results. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Entrepreneurial Human Capital and Factors Influencing Firm Survival 
2.1. Entrepreneurs’ Backgrounds, Human Capital, and Survival 
The early years after startup are crucial for a firm’s future. Virtually all studies in 
economics, management and organizational ecology find that younger firms confront 
higher probabilities of exit than their older counterparts (see, for instance, Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). The entrepreneurship literature often regards the first three years after 
startup as critical for the survival and success of new firms (Littunen et al., 1998). The 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys of entrepreneurial activity define 
young businesses as firms that have been active for three and a half years or less.3 
Geroski (1995, p. 424), points out that the “mechanism of displacement, which seems to 
be the most palpable consequence of entry, affects young, new firms more severely.” In 
economics, market selection theories argue that firms are unsure about their efficiency 
prior to entry and learn from noisy signals provided by the market, leading to higher exit 
rates for recent startups firms than for older businesses (see, for instance, Jovanovic, 
1982). Organizational ecologists speak of ‘liability of newness’ (Freeman et al., 1983) 
to describe the stylized fact that hazard rates decline monotonically with age as firms 
learn and adapt. Newly formed firms are less likely to be able to cope with 
environmental challenges than established organizations. 
                                                
3 According to the GEM definition, an enterprise is classified as a young business if it has paid salaries 
and wages for more than three months but for less than 42 months, and as an established business if it has 
paid salaries and wages for more than 42 months (Acs et al., 2005). 
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The findings of economists and organizational ecologists suggest that the faster a 
firm learns about the fit between its resources and capabilities and market conditions, 
and the more able it is to adapt its competences to market requirements, the more likely 
it will survive the critical early years after startup. The availability of pre-entry 
knowledge about innovative capabilities, marketing and finance, and organizational 
routines should influence significantly the probability of survival in these critical early 
years, when firms have had little or no time to learn about the market. For new firms 
that do not result from diversification or joint venturing operations, pre-entry 
capabilities are associated primarily with the founders. Entrepreneurs with greater 
stocks of human capital will be less uncertain about their efficiency and will be able to 
learn faster about market conditions, therefore reducing the probability of early exit. 
Brüderl et al. (1992) propose a framework distinguishing general and specific forms 
of entrepreneurial human capital, where general human capital includes education levels 
while specific human capital includes work experience and industry-specific experience. 
General and specific entrepreneurial human capital enhance the productivity of the 
founder-manager. We build on this distinction between general and specific forms of 
entrepreneurial human capital, associating them with specific phenomena that have been 
highlighted by entrepreneurship research (see, for instance, Dahl and Reichstein, 2007) 
as being related with the extent of opportunity identification and exploitation: spinouts, 
habitual entrepreneurship and, in particular, necessity-based vs. opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship. 
Let us start with general human capital. It can be claimed that, through formal 
education, individuals acquire fundamental abilities to learn about markets and 
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technology, and better recognize opportunities in the surrounding environment (Shane, 
2000). Formal education also allows individuals to develop learning aptitudes and 
organizational skills to better organize to exploit those opportunities (Grant, 1996). 
Consequently, higher levels of education may give the entrepreneur higher ability to 
solve problems and make decisions regarding business development. Better educated 
entrepreneurs may also have better social networks, as a result of their longer stay in the 
education system, and that may be useful for the development of their businesses 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Furthermore, better educated people should command higher 
average earnings as paid employees and, therefore, find it easier to fund their new 
business. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of studies of the returns to education for 
entrepreneurs, Van der Sluis et al. (2005) conclude that entrepreneurship performance, 
regardless of the performance measure used, is significantly and positively affected by 
formal education. We then expect that startups whose founder has a higher level of 
formal education have a greater probability of early survival.  
People with more work experience and who have performed managerial duties are 
more likely to be in a better position to detect opportunities and raise capital, thus 
setting up larger and better-equipped businesses (Colombo et al., 2004). Knowledge of 
how to manage a business has a strong tacit form and can be gained informally by 
observing and making business decisions (Cooper et al., 1994). People with greater 
managerial experience are also more likely to have developed the necessary skills to 
organize new businesses (Shane, 2000). We therefore expect that startups whose 
founder has more years of work experience and, in particular, more years of managerial 
experience have a greater probability of early survival.  
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Work experience is likely to be more useful for entrepreneurs when it takes place in 
the industry where the new firm is being started. In particular, entrepreneurs who forfeit 
employment in an established incumbent to create a startup in the same industry –  
thereby creating a spinout4 – are more likely to achieve early success. People who have 
worked in the same industry for some time are likely to have accrued industry-specific 
human capital, meaning specialized market and technological knowledge, plus a 
network of professional and social contacts that facilitate the acquisition and 
management of both technical and human resources. In addition, people that have 
worked in the industry may have already established relationships with customers, 
suppliers, or other stakeholders. Founders with greater industry experience are likely to 
bring to their new firm specific knowledge about a wide range of issues, such as 
customer demand, products, technologies, suppliers and competitors (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002). Previous research has shown that experience of the business owner 
in the same industry in which a new business is started improves a firm’s chances of 
survival and posterior firm performance (Bosma et al., 2004), even if such experience 
does not occur right before creating a startup. A period of time spent away from the 
industry may accelerate the depreciation of industry-specific human capital. Hence, 
while we expect that startups whose founder has more years of experience in the same 
industry should have a greater probability of early survival, startups whose founder was 
employed in the same industry right before startup (i.e. spinouts) will benefit more from 
industry-specific human capital. 
                                                
4 This definition of spinout is used by, among others, Agarwal et al (2004) and Klepper (2001, 2007) – 
who uses the term “spinoff.” While it may be deemed too inclusive (not all founders incorporated into 
this concept are necessarily exploiting opportunities discovered while working for their previous 
employer), any bias that may be introduced would counteract the effects supporting the hypotheses being 
tested. 
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Specific human capital which is valuable for new business founders also manifests 
itself through entrepreneurial experience. Habitual entrepreneurs, meaning individuals 
who have started at least one business prior to founding a new one,5 include individuals 
who own several businesses simultaneously (portfolio entrepreneurs), as well as those 
who start a business subsequent to closing – or selling – another (serial entrepreneurs). 
Individuals who have accrued experience as business owners should possess higher 
accumulated levels of entrepreneurial human capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Stam et al., 
2008). In particular, they should have better managerial and technical skills, better 
networks of contacts, access to market-specific information and knowledge, and thus 
should be better equipped to discover and take advantage from new business 
opportunities (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).  
The value of human capital is likely to be different for serial and portfolio 
entrepreneurs. Serial entrepreneurs experience a break in between entrepreneurial 
events, which may last for an extended time (Amaral et al., 2011) and is likely to 
facilitate depreciation of the stock of specific human capital. Serial entrepreneurship is 
not necessarily associated with success, as it may result simply from a succession of 
business starts and closures. Portfolio entrepreneurs are less likely to face financial 
constraints to start a new firm than serial entrepreneurs, since they can deploy assets 
from their current firm (or firms) in the new startup. Recent research finds that serial 
entrepreneurs’ performance in one venture enhances their performance in subsequent 
ventures only temporarily (Parker, 2013). Hence, in addition to a positive effect on 
survival chances from entrepreneurial experience, we expect that startups whose 
                                                
5 The present study is restricted to business owners who have started their businesses, therefore excluding 
those who have acquired or inherited ownership. We believe that, in considering only starters and not 
acquirers and inheritors, we may better approach the concept of entrepreneurship as understood by the 
management literature (Busenitz et al., 2003). 
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founder owns one or more other businesses at the time of founding (portfolio 
entrepreneurs) have a greater probability of early survival.  
The key element in our analysis is the distinction between the role played by human 
capital for opportunity-driven and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs. People who 
give up their current employment to start a new business incur an opportunity cost, so 
they are likely to be doing it due to the discovery of a promising business opportunity. 
People who are driven from unemployment into starting a business are likely to be 
doing it in order to make ends meet. Unemployment is a powerful driver of new firm 
creation. Founding a new firm may be an alternative to uncertain future career prospects 
or even an “escape from unemployment” (Storey, 1991). The empirical evidence 
highlighting the role played by job losses in fostering new startups is quite robust 
(Storey and Jones, 1987). If unemployment is the main incentive for setting up a 
business, there may not be time to look for good opportunities, make detailed plans, get 
appropriate funding, and seek advice. Hence, the chances of survival may be affected by 
selection occurring prior to startup.  
Specific human capital and entrepreneurial abilities may erode with unemployment 
spells. Research in labor economics has found that interrupted careers translate into 
depreciation of human capital stocks. Mincer and Ofek (1982) established that 
interrupted work careers entail substantial wage reductions upon re-entry to the labor 
market, implying depreciation in human capital stocks. A substantial body of 
subsequent research has confirmed that human capital depreciates with time spent away 
from the workplace (see, for instance, Neuman and Weiss, 1995; Albrecht et al., 1999). 
Entrepreneurs’ knowledge and skills acquired previously in the labor market (either as a 
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business owner or a paid employee), while remaining of some value, gradually become 
less applicable as circumstances change, and interruptions associated with 
unemployment spells are likely to accelerate the depreciation of human capital stocks, 
meaning that entrepreneurs who start firms out of unemployment have less abilities (i.e. 
specific industry, finance or marketing knowledge, and organizational routines) to 
exploit them. 
Empirical evidence on entrepreneurial careers has found that those who have entered 
self employment directly from unemployment exit to a higher extent than those who 
have entered directly from paid employment (Carrasco, 1999; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000), 
and that new founders who were formerly unemployed have on average lower economic 
outcomes and a lower propensity to positively contribute to job creation (Andersson and 
Wadensjö, 2006). In view of this discussion, we formulate two key hypotheses: 
H1: startups whose founder was unemployed right before founding have a lower 
probability of early survival.  
H2: different forms of specific human capital of founders may have less positive 
impacts on firm survival probabilities for unemployment-driven entrepreneurs than for 
other entrepreneurs. 
2.2. Control Variables 
Mortality rates vary consistently across firms and industries, regardless of age. An 
extensive literature examining firm-level and industry-level determinants of new firm 
survival and growth has built up over the last decades. Comprehensive reviews of such 
determinants are provided by Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007), and Quatraro and Vivarelli 
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(2013). We use the main results from this literature as guidance for the choice of 
controls used in this study.  
The main firm-level determinant of survival is startup size. While the theoretical 
literature does not point towards a clear prediction of the effect of firm size on survival, 
empirical evidence supporting a “liability of smallness”, meaning a negative 
relationship between hazard rates and size, is overwhelmingly unambiguous (Vivarelli, 
2007). Therefore, we expect that firms that enter at a lower scale will have a lower 
probability of survival and use firm size at the time of founding as a control variable. 
The resource-based view of the firm posits that the ability of firms to survive and to 
compete successfully is strongly influenced by the extent to which firms develop firm-
specific assets, processes and routines which cannot be easily imitated by competitors 
(Peteraf, 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). A number of authors have pointed out that 
a firm’s knowledge resides in its human resources (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Teece et 
al., 1997). Mata and Portugal (2002) argue that the level of the formal education held by 
a firm’s workforce can be regarded as a measure, albeit imperfect, of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities. We therefore use the level of education of employees at the 
time of founding as a control.  
The literature reports four main industry-level features influencing survival: i) 
economies of scale; ii) market concentration; ii) barriers to entry; and iv) industry 
growth (see, for instance, Mata and Portugal, 2002; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
However, the effects of some of these factors are not always consistent in the theoretical 
and empirical literature (Vivarelli, 2007). Since the industry where the startup occurs 
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clearly influences survival in a variety of ways, this study accounts for this influence by 
using industry fixed effects (i.e. industry dummies) in the empirical analysis. 
Finally, we also control for the gender of the entrepreneur. Empirical findings on the 
success of ventures started by female entrepreneurs have been mixed. For instance, 
Cooper et al. (1994) find that firms with a male entrepreneur have a greater probability 
of high growth, but not of survival. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We explore the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) database, a longitudinal matched 
employer-employee data set built from mandatory information submitted annually by all 
firms with at least one wage earner (excluding agriculture) to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security covering the period from 1986 to 2005. There are a 
minimum of 145,000 firms, 170,000 establishments and 2,000,000 workers and 
business owners included in each annual survey. Firms, establishments and individuals 
are fully cross-referenced through the use of a unique identification number, thus 
allowing for the recognition of both new entrants and exiting firms, as well as the 
opening and closure of subsidiary establishments. Mobility of workers and business 
owners across firms and establishments over time can also be traced. For each firm, data 
are available for size (employment), age, location, sector, and number of establishments. 
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Data on business owners and employees include gender, age, function (hierarchical 
level),6 tenure, and formal education.  
We focus our analysis on the founders of startups using four sets (or cohorts) of two 
years each: 1995-96; 1997-98; 1999-2000, and 2001-2002. Estimating econometric 
models for the four cohorts separately allows us to check the structure of the data and 
robustness of results. We restrict the size of cohorts to two years since human capital 
stocks are likely to depreciate, so it is better to compare founders of ventures started 
within a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, separating cohorts of entrants into 
two-year periods also avoids business cycle effects which affect firms entering in 
multiple years differently. Models pooling all data together are also estimated.7 We are 
able to track the background of every founder to the first available year of data, which is 
1986. This means that, for the first year (1995) we trace the work history of founders for 
the period 1986-94, while for the last year (2002) we trace the work history of founders 
for the period 1986-2001. This way we are able to build substantial information on their 
past professional, entrepreneurial and industry-specific experience.  
The sample includes startups in both services and manufacturing, defined at the three 
digit level of aggregation.8 We deliberately use the founder, and not the firm, as the unit 
of analysis, choosing not to aggregate measures of entrepreneurial human capital, and 
instead control for those founders who have partners.9 We follow this procedure since 
aggregating human capital across new business founders is not a simple task. On one 
                                                
6 The data have information about each individual’s occupational position and status within the firm 
coded using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the International 
Classification by Status in Employment (ICSE). 
7 Year-level dummy variables are included in these estimations.  
8 While the data allow for lower levels of industry aggregation, a change in ISIC definitions in 1994 
prevents us from making correspondences between sectors before and after that alteration. Such 
correspondences are indispensable to track founders’ pre-entry experiences. 
9 About 51% of startups are founded by entrepreneurial teams.  
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hand, it is not clear whether simply adding indicators of entrepreneurial human capital 
across the entrepreneurial team would produce an accurate measure of entrepreneurial 
human capital for the firm; on the other hand, considering only one of the founders as 
representative of the firm (even if it is the one with the highest levels of entrepreneurial 
human capital) while ignoring the other partners is also likely to be inaccurate. 
We expect that firms started by teams of founders will have a greater chance of 
survival, since a team likely benefits from more entrepreneurial human capital than a 
single founder. Young businesses are usually formed of like-minded individuals with 
the same initial view about the best course of action for the firm (Klepper, 2007), so the 
cohesion of the team will be high, at least in the first years after founding. Often teams 
coalesce to launch a venture because their members have worked together as employees 
in a larger organization or in a previous entrepreneurial venture; at other times, the 
founders themselves select team members, often with diverse talents and skills (Barney 
et al., 1996), so the process of venture team formation may endow teams with 
complementary knowledge and capabilities.  
QP data include all wage workers and business owners who are at least 18 years old. 
While we include all founders in our sample regardless of their year of birth, we control 
for founder age by including dummy variables for age classes: less than 30 years old; 
30-39 years old; and 40-49 years old. The age class that serves as reference for the age 
dummies corresponds to founders that are 50 years or older).10 While older people have 
had more time to build better networks, identify valuable opportunities, and are more 
likely to have accumulated capital to finance the startup (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
                                                
10 Entrepreneur age is measured in the year of founding. Using dummy variables for age classes 
considerably reduces the inevitable high correlation between age and work experience.  
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1998), evidence shows that the positive effect of age on the probability of success fades 
as age increases, since older people may be less prone to embark upon the more 
demanding work schedules required by self-employment, and are closer to retirement 
(Evans and Leighton, 1989). We group all founders who are 50 years or older into a 
single age class since several empirical studies suggest that the negative effect of age on 
survival starts to dominate the positive effect around this age (Rees and Shah, 1986; 
Carrasco, 1999). 
Table 1 displays the main descriptive statistics for each cohort of founders as well as 
the total sample. The number of startups recorded increased consistently during the 
period of analysis. This could be partly due to increased coverage of the database. 
However, since all the firms report their age and the tenure of their employees, it is 
possible to identify true startups vs. firms that simply show up in the database for the 
first time. Hence, our sample reflects a true increase in startup activity.  
Table 1 about here  
The average age of founders, the number of founders per firm, the proportion of 
unemployed founders and the proportion of survivors show little variation across the 
four cohorts. The proportion of previously unemployed11 founders is particularly 
striking, at over 75% for the whole sample, never falling below 72% for any of the 
cohorts.  
                                                
11 The average length of an unemployment spell in our data is 1.3 years. While the vast majority of 
individuals who appear ‘unemployed’ in the Quadros de Pessoal database in fact correspond to the share 
of the workforce who is without occupation and actively searching for employment, a small minority may 
be composed of inactive individuals (e.g. people who were once employed but went back to being full 
time students), or individuals who are employed in industries not covered by the database (e.g. 
agriculture). 
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Tables 1A and 1B present separate descriptive statistics for previously unemployed 
(necessity-based) and previously employed (opportunity-based) founders. The 
proportion of opportunity-based founders increases from about 22% in 1995-96 to about 
27% in 2001-2002. Key statistics appear not to be much different for the two types of 
founders: they are, on average, about the same age, start similarly sized companies 
(slightly larger for opportunity-based entrepreneurs)12 and form similarly sized venture 
teams. The survival rate of opportunity-driven founders is a little above average in all 
cohorts and for the whole sample, while the survival rate for unemployment-driven 
founders is consistently slightly below average.  
Tables 1A and 1B about here 
Detailed variable definitions plus descriptive statistics for the whole sample (1995-
2002) are presented in Table 2. Spinouts represent about 7% of the sample, while 
portfolio entrepreneurs are about 6%.  
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Correlations between explanatory variables 
are generally small, with the exception of work experience and industry-specific 
experience, which are highly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.62); 
however, this correlation does not seem to affect the estimations significantly.  
Table 3 about here 
                                                
12 During the period under analysis, there was no government support specifically directed at start-ups by 
the unemployed in Portugal. Support was available equally regardless of employment status. 
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Assuming that necessity-based entrepreneurship corresponds directly to 
unemployment-driven entrepreneurship raises some problems, since data are collected 
on a yearly basis. Firstly, a founder of a new business in year t who was registered as 
unemployed in year t-1 might have found a job in between the data collection time in 
year t-1 and the new business start. Someone in these circumstances is recorded by the 
data as if he/she were starting the firm following unemployment, when in fact he/she is 
starting the firm following employment. Likewise, a founder of a new business in year t 
who was registered as employed at time t-1 might have undergone a short spell of 
unemployment in between the data collection time in year t-1 and the new business 
start, and is therefore erroneously recorded by the data as if he/she were starting the firm 
following employment. In spite of such limitations, we believe the approach followed 
here to be advantageous for the study of the research questions investigated in the 
present paper. 
3.2. Methodology 
We observe firms in the year of entry and again three years later. Our dependent 
variable (survival) is a dummy that assumes value one if the firm is still operating and 
the founder is still the owner (or one of the owners) three years after startup, and value 
zero otherwise. Exit may result from closure or acquisition. However, acquisition is a 
rare phenomenon in the Portuguese context (Mata et al., 1995) and the overwhelming 
majority of exits is likely to result from closure.  
All variables used refer to the moment of entry, as we are interested in the effect of 
founding conditions (such as the pre-entry experiences of entrepreneurs) on early 
survival. The effect of the explanatory variables can then be captured using the Logit 
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regression model of the probability of survival. In order to examine the differences in  
outcomes between opportunity-driven and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs, we 
estimate separate models for those founders who were previously employed and for 
those who were previously unemployed. In this way we are able to verify whether the 
effects of the entrepreneur human capital variables differ according to the type of 
entrepreneur.13  
 
4. Results 
Logit models for the probability of survival three years after startup are estimated for 
each cohort separately and for the whole sample. In all estimations the standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. The results are, in general, quite comparable, confirming 
that the models are robust and each of the cohorts displays similar features. Table 4 
presents the estimations for a ‘reduced’ model including both opportunity-based and 
unemployment-driven founders using only firm-level variables and industry dummies 
(the controls), and a dummy variable identifying previously employed founders. 
Coefficients for the estimations using the whole sample are, in general, more significant 
than coefficients for estimations using each individual cohort, which should be expected 
given the larger number of observations. The signs of the coefficients for each variable 
are persistently the same across cohorts and for the whole sample. 
Table 4 about here 
                                                
13 An alternative procedure would be to estimate single models including interaction (moderator) 
variables corresponding to the product between the employment (opportunity-based) dummy and each of 
the entrepreneur human capital variables. However, the estimation of separate models for each type of 
entrepreneur avoids using interaction effects whose interpretation, especially in a Logit framework, is 
always problematic.  
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Of particular interest are the coefficients for the Employment variable in Table 4. 
The expectation is that previously employed (i.e. opportunity-based) founders should be 
significantly more likely to survive than unemployment-driven ones, but the positive 
coefficients are only weakly significant for the whole sample and two of the cohorts. 
Hence, hypothesis H1 is supported only weakly by the data, if at all. This result suggests 
that differences between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven founders do not 
necessarily arise directly from the nature or quality of the opportunity being exploited, 
and are more likely to result from the use of their abilities (i.e. accumulated human 
capital). 
In Tables 5A and 5B we estimate separate models for previously unemployed and 
previously employed founders, adding the entrepreneurial human capital variables to the 
mix of explanatory variables in order to test hypothesis H2.14 The inclusion of the set of 
variables accounting for entrepreneurial characteristics in Tables 5A and 5B 
significantly improves the models.15 A model testing the effects of different sources or 
forms of entrepreneur human capital for the sample as a whole was also estimated,16 
showing mixed results for the effects of human capital variables. Portfolio entrepreneurs 
and spinout founders are significantly more likely to survive, confirming our 
expectations for these two types of entrepreneurial human capital, while other 
entrepreneurial human capital variables are insignificant. These results suggest that 
advantages of entrepreneurs who were not unemployed before startup concentrate on 
                                                
14 A model pooling all entrepreneurs and adding interaction effects between the Employment variable and 
the human capital variables was estimated, showing significantly positive interaction effects favoring 
previously employed founders, thus supporting the results of the separate estimations presented here. 
Results are available from the authors upon request. 
15 Tests comparing the Wald statistics for models with and without the variables accounting for 
entrepreneurial characteristics show that the inclusion of this set of variables significantly improves 
explanatory power at the 1% significance level for all cohorts individually and the sample as a whole. 
16 Results are omitted due to lack of space and are available from the authors upon request. 
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spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs, while there seem to be no significant 
differences in early survival probabilities between unemployment-driven entrepreneurs 
and previously employed entrepreneurs who are not part of those two specific groups. 
Tables 5A, 5B about here 
The effects of both firm-level variables and industry dummies are analogous for both 
types of founders, suggesting that any differences in performance are likely to originate 
from entrepreneurial characteristics (human capital). The control variables have, in 
general, the expected effects, confirming previous findings in the empirical literature. 
The variable accounting for employee education becomes insignificant when 
entrepreneur human capital variables are added, which is not surprising since startups 
are usually small (the average startup size across all cohorts is 4.34 wage earners) and 
their faith is more likely to hinge on the founders’ choices.17 Entrepreneurial teams are 
significantly more likely to survive the critical first years after startup, suggesting that 
there are tangible and intangible features of entrepreneurial human capital that can be 
added or matched across the members of the entrepreneurial team, positively 
influencing startup survival. 
The estimations in Table 5B do not include the variables accounting for spinouts and 
portfolio entrepreneurs, since in these cases the founders were not unemployed before 
startup. Comparing effects of the other sources of entrepreneurial human capital 
between opportunity-based and unemployment-driven entrepreneurs provides quite 
striking results. While the variables accounting for age, gender, and the existence of an 
entrepreneurial team yield consistent results, the coefficient estimations for 
                                                
17 Also, recent research finds evidence of a match between founders’ and early employees’ characteristics 
and human capital (Baptista et al., 2013). 
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entrepreneurial human capital variables yield very different results for necessity-
based/unemployment-driven (Table 5A) and opportunity-based (Table 5B) founders. 
While variables accounting for education levels and specific forms of human capital 
are generally insignificant (and even display counter-intuitive signs, as is the case of 
industry experience and managerial experience) for necessity-based/unemployment-
driven entrepreneurs, the same variables are significant and display the expected signs 
for opportunity-based entrepreneurs. We can therefore claim that our hypothesis H2 is 
in general supported by the data. 
Higher levels of education have a significantly positive impact on the probability of 
early survival for both types of founders.18 However, work experience, industry 
experience, and managerial experience only contribute significantly to increase the 
probability of early survival of opportunity-based entrepreneurs (across all cohorts and 
for the whole sample) and not for necessity-based ones.  
Entrepreneurial experience seems to be an important factor in the survival of 
necessity-based entrepreneurs, but not of opportunity-based ones. This suggests that, in 
the case of opportunity-based founders, other kinds of pre-entry human capital such as 
general education and work, industry, and managerial experience can successfully 
compensate for the lack of entrepreneurial experience in the case of opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs, possibly because higher levels of general and specific human capital help 
founders learn faster about the market, technology, and internal organization, and 
                                                
18 The completion of a high school degree seems to have a bigger impact when compared with primary 
education than a university degree, but both are significantly positive across all cohorts and for the 
complete sample. 
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provide them with the required networks of contacts regarding sources of finance, 
prospective customers, and suppliers. 
Overall, the results suggest that, while a variety of forms of specific human capital 
(particularly industry-specific and managerial experience) counterbalance the lack of 
entrepreneurial experience in opportunity-driven founders, unemployment-driven 
founders may benefit from accumulated learning that occurred in previous 
entrepreneurial experiences which might provide them with knowledge about how to 
sustain  a business in the early years, or possibly make them more persistent in the face 
of poor outcomes.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study sought to examine the role played by pre-entry capabilities and human 
capital associated with the experiences of founders in contributing for the early survival 
of new businesses, highlighting differences between opportunity based and necessity-
based/unemployment-driven entrepreneurs. It can be argued that entrepreneurial 
characteristics play an especially important role in the critical early years of a startup, 
when the mission and organization of the firm are being established, and the hiring of 
key personnel is being carried out.  
In summary, the results imply that for entrepreneurs who were employed prior to 
startup – that is, those more likely to be driven by opportunity discovery – both general 
and specific forms of entrepreneurial human capital contribute to increase the 
probability of surviving the critical first three years after startup. However, for 
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entrepreneurs who were unemployed prior to startup – and therefore more likely to be 
starting a firm as an escape from unemployment – only previous entrepreneurial 
experience seems to increase significantly the probability of early survival. The results 
also highlight two cases where the chances of early survival are especially strong and 
significant: spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs have consistently greater 
chances of early survival than other founders.   
The creation of new firms involves both opportunity discovery and evaluation, as 
would-be entrepreneurs decide whether an opportunity can be turned into a business 
which is sufficiently profitable to offset the opportunity costs involved. Opportunity 
evaluation and exploitation involves knowledge about demand, technology, 
organization, customers and suppliers that may be learned by founders prior to entry. 
The advantages uncovered  for spinout founders and portfolio entrepreneurs, as well as 
the findings that industry-specific and managerial experience matter only for founders 
who were not unemployed prior to startup, suggest that these are indeed more likely to 
have engaged in opportunity evaluation and are better equipped for opportunity 
exploitation, while unemployment-driven entrepreneurs are less likely to search and 
evaluate opportunities, relying on previous entrepreneurial experience to persevere in 
the early years after startup.  
The specific phenomena of spinouts and portfolio entrepreneurship deserve particular 
attention in the study of pre-entry capabilities and entrepreneurial human capital. 
Firstly, spinouts probably incorporate an organizational heritage from the parent-
company, by which founders possibly replicate knowledge, technologies and 
organizational features learned in the firms they left, which represent the environments 
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where they probably discovered their entrepreneurial opportunity (Klepper, 2001; 
2007); secondly, portfolio entrepreneurship is likely to provide more network 
connections and knowledge of potential customers, and a greater ability to overcome 
financial constraints. In particular, it is likely that for both types of founders the 
opportunity for the new business was discovered and evaluated in the environment of 
the previous business.  
We believe these results hold meaningful implications for both theory building and 
policy-making. Pre-entry knowledge of entrepreneurs is a significant determinant of 
early survival, but mostly in the cases where founders actually bore an opportunity cost 
(leaving their previous employment) to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity. In these 
cases, pre-entry knowledge associated with general and specific human capital helps 
discover and evaluate opportunities, set up the business, and endure the critical first 
years after founding, possibly by facilitating more cumulative learning about the 
market. It can be argued that these entrepreneurs are the ones more likely to grow their 
businesses, create jobs, and contribute to general economic growth. These results are 
important for those in charge of private and public institutions dedicated to assist the 
development of entrepreneurial startups. While aiding startups by the unemployed may 
be a socially important endeavor, policy makes should not expected these startups to 
survive in the long term and contribute significantly to employment growth. In contrast, 
aiding those founders who face an opportunity cost to found their businesses is more 
likely to provide positive results. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. 
Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Unemployed 
Founders 
Percentage of 
Founders 
Surviving after 
three years 
1995-1996 28772 4.70 36.28 1.38 77.38 74.69 
1997-1998 32180 4.57 36.15 1.37 78.51 75.99 
1999-2000 44749 3.95 35.88 1.37 77.68 72.50 
2001-2002 64217 4.32 38.72 1.39 72.02 79.07 
Total 169918 4.34 37.07 1.38 75.65 76.01 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of previously unemployed 
founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Founders Surviving 
after three years  
1995-1996 22263 4.37 36.13 1.36 74.38 
1997-1998 25266 4.23 35.97 1.36 75.49 
1999-2000 34759 3.61 35.93 1.36 71.86 
2001-2002 46248 4.10 39.07 1.37 78.09 
Total 128536 4.04 37.10 1.36 75.25 
 
 
 
Table 1B: Descriptive statistics for the four cohorts of previously employed 
founders 
Cohorts No. of Founders 
Avg. 
Startup 
Size 
Avg. Age of 
Founder 
No. of 
Founders 
per Firm 
Percentage of 
Founders Surviving 
after three years  
1995-1996 6509 6.01 36.80 1.43 75.74 
1997-1998 6914 6.04 36.79 1.41 77.80 
1999-2000 9990 5.29 35.67 1.40 74.72 
2001-2002 17969 4.98 37.83 1.45 81.57 
Total 41382 5.39 36.97 1.43 78.37 
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Table 2: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition No. Obs* Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Survival Variable = 1 if both firm and founder remain active three years after founding, and 0 otherwise 169918 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Log Size Log of the number of employees of the firm at founding 169918 1.23 0.73 0 6.46 
Emp Education Proportion of employees that are university graduates at founding  165354 0.016 0.11 0 1 
Age below 30 Variable = 1 if founder is 29 years of age or younger at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Age 30-39 Variable = 1 if founder is between 30 and 39 years of age at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Age 40-49 Variable = 1 if founder is between 40 and 49 years of age at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 161582 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Gender Variable = 1 if founder is female, and 0 if it is male 169918 0.28 0.45 0 1 
University Grad Variable = 1 if founder is a university graduate at the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.08 0.28 0 1 
High School 
Grad 
Variable = 1 if founder is a high school graduate at 
the time of founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Work Exp Number of years since founder entered the labor market 169918 1.58 2.20 0 8 
Spinout 
Variable = 1 if founder was working in an 
incumbent of the startup’s industry in the year 
before founding, and 0 otherwise 
169918 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Industry Exp Number of years founder worked in the startup’s industry prior to founding 169918 1.31 1.98 0 8 
Managerial Exp Number of years the founder worked in one of the top three hierarchical levels listed in the data set19 169918 0.52 1.28 0 8 
Entrep Exp 
Variable = 1 if individual has founded at least one 
firm in the past, but was not a business owner at 
founding, and 0 otherwise 
169918 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Portfolio Variable = 1 if individual owned at least another business at founding, and 0 otherwise 167838 0.06 0.38 0 1 
Entrep Team Variable = 1 if firm is being founded by more than one individual, and 0 otherwise 169918 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Employment Variable = 1 if founder was employed in the year before founding 169918 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Year Dummies Year dummies for cohort estimations: Variables = 1 for firms founded in 1995 and 0 otherwise; 1997 and 0 otherwise; 1999 and 0 otherwise; 2001 and 0 otherwise 
Industry 
Dummies Industry dummies at the three-digit level 
* The number of observations is not the same for all variables since there are missing values across the data set. We have 
therefore an unbalanced panel. 
                                                
19 As pointed out earlier, data report each individual’s position in the firm’s hierarchy according to a 
specific code. There are eight categories or hierarchical levels. These are, from lower to higher: 
apprentices, interns and trainees; non-skilled professionals; semi-skilled professionals; skilled 
professionals; higher-skilled professionals; supervisors and team leaders; intermediary managers: and top 
managers. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
Lo
g 
Si
ze
 
Em
p 
Ed
uc
at
 
A
ge
 b
el
ow
 3
0 
A
ge
 3
0-
39
 
A
ge
 4
0-
49
 
G
en
de
r 
U
ni
v 
G
ra
d 
H
ig
h 
Sc
h 
G
ra
d 
W
or
k 
Ex
p 
Sp
in
ou
t 
In
du
st
ry
 E
xp
 
M
an
ag
 E
xp
 
En
tr
ep
 E
xp
 
Po
rt
fo
lio
 
En
tr
ep
 T
ea
m
 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Log Size 1.00                              
Emp Educat 0.04 1.00                            
Age below 30 0.00 0.00 1.00                          
Age 30-39 0.02 0.01 -0.38 1.00                        
Age 40-49 0.01 -0.01 -0.30 -0.46 1.00                      
Gender  -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00                    
Univ Grad -0.03 0.24 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.04 1.00                  
High Sch Grad -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.13 1.00                
Work Exp 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 1.00              
Spinout 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.37 1.00            
Industry Exp 0.15 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.62 0.43 1.00          
Manag Exp 0.12 0.07 -0.14 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.39 1.00        
Entrep Exp 0.13 0.01 -0.13 -0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 0.33 0.51 1.00      
Portfolio 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.17 0.20 1.00    
Entrep Team 0.34 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 1.00  
Employment 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.14 1.00 0.37 0.40 -0.11 1.00 0.32 1.00 
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Table 4: Logit estimates for survival including firm characteristics and 
industry dummies 
 
All 
Years 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 
Log Size 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.59*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Emp Education 0.25*** 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.23 
  [0.00] [0.577] [0.212] [0.332] [0.035] 
Employment 0.16* 0.13* 0.13 0.14* 0.14** 
 [0.086] [0.099] [0.720] [0.699] [0.576] 
Constant 2.19 1.60 1.70 1.71 1.75 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Entrepreneurs  169918 28689 32070 44661 64069 
Number of Clustered Firms 123324 20814 23372 32624 46213 
Wald chi2 1422.87 344.02 421.03 581.51 658.15 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
 P-values are in brackets. (*) significant at 10% level, (**)significant at 5% level, (***)significant at 1% 
level.  
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Table 5A: Logit estimates for survival of necessity-based entrepreneurs including 
entrepreneur characteristics, firm characteristics, and industry dummies  
  All Years 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 
Log Size 0.44*** 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.55*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Emp Education 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.14 
  [0.462] [0.793] [0.834] [0.96] [0.294] 
Age below 30 -0.20*** -0.12** -0.15*** -0.24*** -0.25*** 
  [0.00] [0.038] [0.009] [0.00] [0.00] 
Age 30-39 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
  [0.668] [0.153] [0.758] [0.488] [0.11] 
Age 40-49 0.05** 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.07** 
  [0.018] [0.483] [0.164] [0.542] [0.045] 
Gender  -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.06 -0.13*** -0.04 
  [0.00] [0.004] [0.127] [0.00] [0.159] 
University Grad 0.06 0.17* 0.03 0.04 0.04 
  [0.176] [0.095] [0.723] [0.499] [0.484] 
High School Grad 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08** 
  [0.722] [0.621] [0.637] [0.491] [0.05] 
Work Exp 0.002 -0.04 -0.001 0.03 0.004 
  [0.831] [0.143] [0.956] [0.084] [0.711] 
Industry Exp -0.002 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  [0.507] [0.462] [0.573] [0.568] [0.634] 
Managerial Exp -0.02* 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.05* 
  [0.091] [0.314] [0.509] [0.096] [0.084] 
Entrep Exp 0.09*** 0.05 0.01 0.15*** 0.18*** 
  [0.004] [0.465] [0.881] [0.012] [0.002] 
Entrep Team 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.27*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant 1.24*** 1.18*** 1.16*** 1.29*** 1.22*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Entrepreneurs  119506 20415 22382 31159 45091 
Number of Clustered Firms 92725 15725 17276 24026 35353 
Wald chi2 3628.06 534.56 647.26 1020.1 1835.5 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
 P-values are in brackets. (*) significant at 10% level, (**)significant at 5% level, (***)significant at 1% 
level.  
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Table 5B: Logit estimates for survival of opportunity-based entrepreneurs including 
entrepreneur characteristics, firm characteristics, and industry dummies  
  All Years 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 
Log Size 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.55*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Emp Education 0.14 -0.40 0.83 -0.23 0.27 
  [0.323] [0.363] [0.099] [0.409] [0.179] 
Age below 30 -0.12** 0.13 0.13 -0.26** -0.26*** 
  [0.017] [0.303] [0.303] [0.016] [0.001] 
Age 30-39 0.02*** 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.08 
  [0.002] [0.007] [0.192] [0.928] [0.247] 
Age 40-49 0.08*** 0.15 0.20* 0.06 0.04 
  [0.001] [0.169] [0.094] [0.577] [0.573] 
Gender  -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.12 -0.13* -0.09* 
  [0.00] [0.01] [0.163] [0.066] [0.068] 
University Grad 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.021*** 0.022* 0.06** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.08] [0.004] 
High School Grad 0.10** 0.05** 0.11** 0.06*** 0.11** 
  [0.011] [0.033] [0.024] [0.002] [0.044] 
Spinout 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.11** 0.10*** 
  [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.02] [0.001] 
Work Exp 0.04*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
  [0.00] [0.16] [0.002] [0.012] [0.00] 
Industry Exp 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
  [0.00] [0.016] [0.002] [0.001] [0.00] 
Managerial Exp 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 
  [0.01] [0.04] [0.008] [0.018] [0.011] 
Entrep Exp 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 
  [0.887] [0.676] [0.85] [0.409] [0.67] 
Portfolio 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.16 0.32** 0.27*** 
  [0.00] [0.002] [0.378] [0.043] [0.001] 
Entrep Team 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.31*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant 1.05*** 0.97*** 1.32*** 1.35*** 0.78*** 
  [0.00] [0.014] [0.014] [0.00] [0.00] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Entrepreneurs 35917 5148 5198 7535 17535 
Number of Clustered Firms 29367 4172 4250 6209 14341 
Wald chi2 1300.3 182.66 237.09 301.55 841.88 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
 P-values are in the brackets. (*) significant at 10% level, (**)significant at 5% level, (***)significant at 1% level.  
 
